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ANTITRUST AND THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE
JERROLD

L.

WALDEN*

A firm belief in competition as the solution to all economic problems characterized the catechism of the framers of the Sherman Act.'
In an age when the social evils of industrialism may have outweighed
its benefits, those enacting the law saw in the ever burgeoning trusts
an evil of extreme magnitude which should be extirpated at the earliest
opportunity. 2 If only competition in industry could be preserved
against the ever encroaching monopolies, a just economy would spread
its benefits to all.
There was much evidence to support the creed of Senator Sherman
and his supporters at the time. The country had long suffered at the
hands of the large railroad combinations which discriminated against
various sections of the nation in freight rates. Such large combines as
the Standard Oil Trust had driven countless independent businessmen
from the scene as a result of their predatory practices. 3 The passage of
the antitrust laws constituted a monumental protest against the business practices of the "Robber Barons."
However, the decades following the enactment of the Sherman
Act saw, if anything, an intensity in the growth of large industrial combinations. A study of the fifty-seven corporations doing a billion-dollar
business in 1962 and comprising the leaders of the present industrial
system disclosed that almost three-quarters of them had their genesis
in the two decades immediately before or after the passage of the Act.4
Insofar as it was designed to discourage the growth of large combinations, it thus seems that the Sherman Act was a failure almost before
the ink was dry on the law.
The Sherman Act was the last gasp of a rapidly receding agricultural economy. In 1889, agriculture had experienced its peak year in
American history to that point. 5 Yet, concomitantly, at some undisclosed
period in the preceding decade, manufacturing had exceeded farm pro-
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duction for the very first time. The United States was on its way to
becoming the leading industrial nation in the world. Not only has the
industrialization of America accelerated since the turn of the century,
but most industry has gradually become concentrated into fewer and
fewer hands. And today, the nation's market place is dominated by a
small coterie of giant concerns.
Whatever the validity of the premises underlying the passage of
the Sherman Act at the time of its enactment, the antitrust laws have
come to have even less relevancy to the American economy in the
closing decades of the twentieth century. The framers of the antitrust
laws saw in them a safeguard for the farmer, the independent businessman, and the small merchant against the inroads then being made in
the economy by the large industrial corporation. Today, however, the
economy can be defined only in terms of the small number of giant
industrial concerns which dominate it from every standpoint. The remainder of the economy is composed in the main of economic satellites
dependent upon the strength of the few leaders of the industrial system
for their continued health and prosperity.
Whether one takes as a starting point the one hundred or two
hundred largest corporations or Fortune's annual list of five hundred
leading manufacturing concerns, the dominance of giant industry over
the American economy is apparent. In 1965, for example, the five hundred largest industrial concerns (comprising the Fortune list) transacted almost 60 percent of all industrial sales in the United States and
accounted for 70 percent of profits. 6 In the same year, they employed
some 11.3 million persons, or more than 60 percent of the nation's industrial work force.7 In 1962, these five hundred companies owned
over two-thirds of all manufacturing assets in the United States.8 Only
this year, the Department of Justice has pointed out that as of 1967,
the nation's two hundred largest manufacturing companies held 58.7
percent of all manufacturing assets, an increase from 48.1 percent in
1948. 9 These figures are extremely impressive and indicate the extent
to which the economic welfare of the nation depends upon the operations of a relatively few large corporate entities.
It is these same large industrial companies which play such a vital
role in the defense effort as part of the "Military-Industrial Complex"
against which President Eisenhower warned the nation upon his de6 Loomis,
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parture from office. Between 1950 and 1958, just 25 large companies received 47.6 percent of all prime military contracts.' 0 In the year ending
June 30, 1967, the Department of Defense awarded $25.6 billion in
new contracts to one hundred large companies or their subsidiaries.
This constituted 65 percent of the total dollar volume of new contracts
awarded that year. And a mere twenty of these large corporations alone
accounted for 40 percent of the dollar volume of such contracts.
The continued advancement of our society in economic terms is
today largely dependent upon research for new products and new
methods of manufacture. The recent moon landings are moot testimony to the importance of research to the nation today. Here again,
a few large companies predominate. IBM, for example, spent $5 billion
over a four-year period for the development of the 360 computer -a
sum roughly equivalent to the annual space budget of the United
States." In 1960, 384 firms with five thousand employees or more accounted for an estimated 85 percent of all industrial research expendi2
tures in the United States.'
It makes little sense to speak realistically of the American economy
other than in terms of the operations of a few large corporations, and it
is in light of this basic industrial structure of the nation that the relevancy of the antitrust laws today must be appraised. It is true that few,
if any, of these large corporations are monopolies in the classical sense.
For the most part, the market place for any particular product or commodity is characterized by oligopoly where only a few sellers predominate. To the classical economist, however, oligopoly was almost as
bad as monopoly because oligopolistic markets tended to behave like
monopolistic ones. But in today's economy, oligopoly, however distasteful it may be, is the rule rather than the exception. In 1958, for example, there were at least 137 industries wherein the four largest
companies accounted for one-half or more of the total value of shipments, and there were some 370 product categories for which the four
leading concerns were responsible for 50 percent or more of the value
of shipments.' 8 The trend toward oligopoly may very well be accelerating in spite of the antitrust laws. 1 4 During the year 1968 a record total
10 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, REVIE1V OF VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT BY ATT'Y GEN. PURSUANT TO
§ 708(a) OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950, Table 5 (Comm. Print 1959).
11J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE 138 (1968).
12J. GALBRAITH, supra note 8.
13 SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY - 1958, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., pt. II,
REPORT BY BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 457 (Comm. Print 1962).
14 See Henderson & Henderson, The Race to Oligopoly, 1968 DUKE LJ. 637.
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of 4,462 corporate mergers took place.'u Added to the 2,975 mergers
occurring in 1967, the 2,377 in 1966, the 2,125 in 1965, the 1,950 in
1964, and the 1,361 in 1963, one finds a grand total of some 15,250
mergers transpiring in the latest six-year period. 16 Their impact on
industrial concentration has yet to be ascertained.
According to the premises underlying the Sherman Act, the marketplace is supposed to control all of the incidents of a firm's economic
behavior, including the setting of production and the determination of
prices. Agreements fixing prices 17 or limiting production' s are unlawful per se. Prices and production should remain variables which fluctuate in accordance with the laws of supply and demand. These laws,
however uncertain they may be, will, if working effectively, serve to
allocate the resources of the economy for the best interests of all concerned. The chief characteristic of the nation's industrial system, however, has been its noticeable ability to relieve itself from the economic
vagaries of the marketplace. Vertical integration has permitted the
large concern to assure itself a source of materials and a market for its
finished product at prices which it is able to control. 19 Insofar as competitors are concerned, there is no need to agree upon prices because
identical prices can be reached simply by reading each others' price
lists. Sound business acumen leads to the conclusion that the individual
concern will prosper most if it adheres to the published prices in the
trade. Thus prices for many commodities are the same and rise and fall
in unison under the phenomenon of price leadership without any overt
conspiracy being involved. Under such circumstances, one wonders
how seriously the Sherman Act's stern admonition against the collective
setting of prices should be taken.
Nor are the prices which are adhered to simply determined by the
laws of supply and demand. The prices set by dominant industrial enterprises are administered, that is, they are fixed by corporate executives
based upon a formula which is calculated to cover costs, reserves for
replacement and expansion, and return to shareholders. Prices are, for
the most part, target prices which, for a predetermined rate of operation, are designed to yield a specified return on investment or net
15 1968 MERGER REVImv 1 (W. T. Grimm & Co., Jan. 1, 1969). Note also that 2,815
mergers occurred during the first half of 1969 alone. 1969 MmYEAR MERGER SuRVEy 1
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17United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
18 See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 US. 469, 493 (1940) (dictum).
19 See J. GAimRArrE, suPra note 8, at 28.
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worth.20 Thus, automobiles, for example, are priced by General Motors
so as to yield a return, after taxes, of 15 percent on capital based on a
21
sales volume of 80 percent of capacity.
A general assault is also leveled by the large corporations on the
demand side of the equation. This is done through large-scale advertising and planned obsolescence. In 1961, for example, the one hundred
leading advertisers spent a grand total of $1,717,920,651 on advertising
in seven various media, or 47.3 percent of the total for all national
advertising. 22 The dominant corporations are also aided in maintaining
demand through government price and monetary policies designed to
maintain a high level of purchasing power throughout the economy.
We can be sure that a large volume of automobile sales will take place
each year although we cannot be certain whether the figure will be
eight million or nine million or more cars.
Despite the Sherman Act, administered prices on the part of
American industry have received the tacit approval of the federal
government. Indeed, when industry has on occasion been tempted to
take advantage of the laws of supply and demand and price accordingly,
it has run into direct confrontation with either the executive or legislative branch of the federal government. In September 1961, for example, President Kennedy wrote the presidents of principal steel companies throughout the nation suggesting that the industry "forgo a
price increase." 23 When United States Steel ignored this request and
instituted a six dollar per ton increase in the price of steel, intense
government pressure was brought to bear throughout the steel industry
to secure a rescission of this raise. 24 Underlying this action and all attempts to set pricing guidelines for industry is the notion that large
American corporations are collectively able to determine the price
levels in the economy and should, as a patriotic measure, do so at levels
suggested by the Government. This is known as price fixing by suasion,
but it certainly finds no sanction in the Sherman Act.
American industry has managed to free itself from the marketplace in still another way through the phenomenon of administered
prices. Administered prices are set high enough by the large industrial
concern so as to leave sufficient sums in retained earnings and deprecia20
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tion accounts to take care of plans for future expansion. Thus most
corporations rely upon internal financing for their expansion needs,
rather than upon the capital markets. Indeed, it is estimated that internal funds have supplied approximately 75 percent of all capital expenditures for replacement and expansion in American industry since
the end of World War 11.25 Thus the capital markets no longer play an
appreciable role in financing the pillars of American capitalism. Instead, it is current consumers, through the prices they pay for products,
rather than investors through the purchase of securities, who provide
the capital funds for American industry today. The capitalist system,
as Marx predicted, has indeed withered away, but in its stead have
arisen a large number of independent units quasi-sovereign in nature
which, through large-scale planning, have insulated themselves from the
whimsical caprices of the capital markets.
The large industrial corporation is no longer a phenomenon
peculiar to the American scene. At the end of 1967, American companies had invested a total of $64.8 billion abroad, 2 and large American concerns were beginning to dominate foreign markets to the same
extent that they prevailed here at home. Canada, with some five thousand subsidiaries of American companies, had become virtually a
colony of the United States. American concerns had invested a total
of $26.5 billion in Canada by the end of 1965.27 It was estimated in
1964 that firms in the United States controlled 95 percent of the
Canadian automobile and automobile parts industry, 89 percent of
rubber products, 64 percent of electrical apparatus, more than 50 percent of the chemical industry, some 43 percent of the pulp and paper
industry, 70 percent of the petroleum and natural gas industry, and
52 percent of the mining and smelting industry.28 And the same report
further estimated that American capital controlled nearly one-half of
29
all of Canada's manufacturing industry at that time.
In Europe, the same picture has emerged. In Great Britain, three
American auto companies have dominated the market - Ford, GM
(Vauxhall) and Chrysler (Rootes), leaving just two British firms for
the non-luxury automobile market.3 0 According to Time magazine, in
1967 Americans owned one-half of all modern industry in Great
25 Walden, supra note 4, at 610 n.14.
20 The Long Term View From The 29th Floor, TieE, Dec. 29, 1967, at 56.
27 N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1967, at 49, col. 4.
28Fowler, The Impact of American Business, ThE ATLANTIC MoNTLY, Nov. 1964, at

119-20.
291 Id.
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Britain.41 In West Germany, by 1965, 40 percent of the auto industry
was controlled by Americans through Opel and Ford; similarly, 30
percent of the oil industry was controlled by such American companies
as Standard Oil, Mobil Oil, Caltex, and Veedol. And a firm which was
three-quarters owned by Owens Illinois Glass had gained control of
40 percent of the glass market. 82 In France, again the same story unfolded. It was reported in 1968 that American firms controlled 40 percent of the petroleum market, 65 percent of films and photographic
paper, 65 percent of farm machinery, 65 percent of telecommunications
equipment, and 45 percent of synthetic rubber.3 In Europe as a whole,
by the end of 1967 Americans controlled 80 percent of the vital computer business, 90 percent of the microcircuit industry, 40 percent
84
of automobiles, and large shares of chemicals, farm machinery and oil.

In the underdeveloped nations of the world, much the same phenomenon can be seen in the form of control by large American corporations
of concessions for raw materials such as copper, bauxite, oil, and iron
ore.
We are now witnessing a new type of colonialism the ramifications
of which are presently beyond conception. Whereas the old colonialism
was imposed by force by a dominant military power upon a backward
nation, the new colonialism is frequently welcomed with open arms
by nations having long histories of economic and political independence. While the forces of nationalism in these countries often inveigh
against foreign interests, these have been more than counterbalanced
by the wealth which large American concerns have succeeded in
bringing to foreign lands in the form of capital investment, production
of goods, employment, and advanced technology.
Antitrust, we must conclude upon reflection, has little relevancy
to the economic and political problems raised by the existence of an
international economy dominated by relatively few giant corporate
entities. We are vitally concerned, to be sure, with the level of prices
established by large basic industries because of the impact upon economic growth, the ability of new firms to survive, increasing consumer
purchasing power, and inflation. But the antitrust laws themselves
prohibit collusive rather than consensual pricing,35 and prices in our
large industries today are imitative rather than conspiratorial in nature.
81 TIME,
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While the Sherman Act may be a potent weapon against monopoly,
modem markets are characterized by several large units which dominate the scene. Their behavior, it is true, may on occasion resemble
that of the monopolist, but the Sherman Act does not make sheer size
itself an offense, 36 nor does it proscribe oligopoly or any of its characteristics. It is extremely doubtful at this time if any large-scale attempt
to fracture American industry would have much likelihood of judicial
success even if it possessed the slightest political feasibility. Nor would
it make much sense in economic terms.
The antitrust laws, it is true, have been utilized to wage a rearguard action against the growth of new entities on the scale of those
which now dominate American and international markets. In a number of significant cases, the courts have been successful in preventing
mergers which would have created a new firm rivaling in size those
already dominating the market. 7 However, one wonders if this has
always been wise in terms of justice or economic sense. Certainly it is
in the interests of those already in a dominant position to prevent the
growth of new firms which might be strong enough to challenge their
hegemony in specific markets. And by preventing just such a development, antitrust may do more to protect existing oligopolies against
competition than it does to promote competition, as is said to be the
case. Even here, however, the antitrust laws have proven less than successful in light of the record number of mergers occurring within the
last few years which has given rise to the conglomerate on the economic
scene. These new entities have grown in number and size sufficiently
to present a significant challenge to present industry leaders.
One of the problems brought about by the size of dominant
American concerns is their ability to influence public policy decisions,
both at home and abroad, in a manner contrary to the interests of the
general public. To what extent does the United Fruit Company, for
example, influence governmental policies toward the Central American
Republics? To what extent is our domestic policy with respect to the
disposal of shale oil on public lands determined by the large oil companies? Undue influence as a result of economic power in the political
arena may have vast consequences not only upon the development of
the economy but upon the general welfare of the nation as well. Yet
the Supreme Court has held in Eastern RailroadPresidents Conference
86 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 US. 417 (1920).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Cf. Briggs Mg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 280 F.2d 747 (6th
Cir. 1960).
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v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,38 that the collective use of economic
power for the purposes of lobbying in the legislature is protected by
the right to petition and is not violative of the antitrust laws. 39 In
United Mine Workers v. Pennington,40 the Court carried this line of
reasoning still further and held that the antitrust laws do not apply to
the collective use of economic power to influence public officials in their
policy making decisions. Thus, in an area of crucial importance if
one is concerned with the abuses of power and size, the Sherman Act
has been shorn of any influence whatsoever, and large corporations
which dominate the economy have been turned completely loose to
combine their efforts to influence legislators and policy makers to favor
their private interests.
If a few hundred large corporations are to dominate the international economy in the foreseeable future, the question that immediately comes to mind is who is to control this enormous aggregate of
power? It is quite clear from what we have said heretofore that it is
not the competitive marketplace which governs the behavior of these
firms. Nor, as has been clearly shown by Professor Adolph Berle, is it
any longer the shareholders of the large corporations. 41 The general
conclusion has been reached that the management of each of these
concerns is a self-perpetuating oligarchy which determines its own
behavior and selects its own successors. 42 Were this the case, it would
present a number of problems which might be difficult to resolve, but
it would at least ensure that this vast amount of power, for better or
worse, was diffused among several hundred separate institutions. There
is evidence to indicate, however, that control over the economy may
be much more highly centralized than would first appear. In 1939, the
National Resources Committee conducted a study of the two hundred
largest non-financial corporations and the fifty largest banks. It found
that the interrelationships between these corporations, such as interlocking directorates, stockholding interests and financing relationships,
were such that there were eight identifiable interest groups which controlled concerns having two-thirds of the assets of the companies
studied. 43 The largest of the interest groups was the Morgan First Na388365 U.S. 127 (1961).
39 See Walden, More About Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and the Right to Petition,
14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1211 (1967).
40381 U.S. 657 (1965).
41 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN COR'ORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967).
42 E. MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SociFTY 6, 13 (1959).
48 NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMISSION,
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tional Bank group which embraced assorted industrials, rails, banks
and utilities with over $30 billion in assets. 44 There is strong evidence
that relationships of this sort still persist and that policy decisions
throughout vast segments of American business may be determined by
a relatively small group of men high up in American financial circles.
In 1967, for example, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company held
substantial minority stock interests in or had interlocking directors
with companies having total assets of $27.7 billion, 5 while First National City Bank of New York had similar relationships with large
corporations having $43.1 billion in assets. 46 Similar relationships between large Eastern banking interests and the industrial sector of the
economy can be shown. What we strongly suspect to be the case is
that not only is industry in the United States highly concentrated, but
also control over American industry is even more highly centralized.
To this problem, too, the antitrust laws furnish little assistance.
The Clayton Act 47 prohibits interlocking directorates between competing corporations but does not cover the sinews of control which a
few large financial institutions can exert over the economy through
minority stockholdings and by strategically placing their minions on
the boards of directors of large segments of American industry.
In conclusion, we have tried briefly to depict the basic structure
of the American economy and the fact that the American pattern seems
destined to prevail throughout the world within a short number of
years barring unforeseen circumstances. We have also endeavored to
show that insofar as providing a solution for the basic problems raised
by the new industrial state, the antitrust laws provide scant comfort.
While the level of administered prices is of utmost concern in view of
the power of a few firms to control the prices of basic commodities,
antitrust, with its concentration on conspiratorial action, can provide
no adequate remedy. Nor are the antitrust proscriptions against monopoly at all relevant to the oligopolistic market structures that prevail
throughout the economy today. To the extent that the antitrust laws
against mergers are employed to prevent the growth of new oligopolies
to compete with those already entrenched in the market, they perhaps
do more harm than good. What is of special significance is the fact that
antitrust proscriptions against collective action have been held in44 Id.
45 STAFF OF THE SUBCOaI M. ON DOMEsTIc FINANCE OF THE HOUSE

CURRENCY, 90TH CONG., 2O SESS. 700 (Comm. Print 1968).
46 Id. at 716.
47
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applicable to the crucial problem of the undue use of economic power
to attain political ends. Finally, we have seen that the antitrust laws
have yet to consider the use of interlocking relationships to further
concentrate economic power into the hands of a few large financial interests. These are all crucial problems for the new industrial state if we
are to preserve a truly independent economy and the people are to
retain control over their society. But for their solution, I fear we must
look elsewhere than to antitrust as it has been traditionally administered.

